The petitioner in Rummel argued that the application of this statute to his three felony convictionsthree relatively small thefts, which in the aggregate amounted to $229.11-constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth amendment. This article inquires into the history of the eighth amendment with an emphasis on the origins of the proportionality argument used in Rummel. The article also explores the other legal issues raised by the Rummel challenge in the Supreme Court. Finally, the article argues that the Supreme Court's rejection of Rummel's eighth amendment argument is fundamentally sound and that the cost of full review of the length of prison sentences far outweighs the "compelling" nature of cases such as Rummel.
CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT IN HISTORY
The eighth amendment reads: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted." 4 The wording is virtually identical to a provision found in the English Bill of Rights of 1689.5 Traditional history explains this provision as outlawing torture and barbarous punishments such as those imposed during the "Bloody Assizes." ' In 1685, CatholicJames II succeeded his brother, Anglican Charles II, as the King of England. Shortly thereafter, Charles' illegitimate son, James, the Duke of Monmouth, launched an unsuccessful invasion of England. This caused James II to cancel the autumn assize of 1685. In its place he created a special commission to try the rebels and appointed Chief Justice Jeffreys to lead it.
This special commission, now known, as the "Bloody Assizes," conducted hundreds of trials for treason in which those found guilty were executed in the traditional English manner-the condemned man was drawn on a cart to the gallows where he was hanged by the neck, cut down while still alive, disemboweled and his bowels burnt before him, then beheaded and quartered. Review, 8 Anthony Granucci has suggested that the cruel and unusual punishment clause in the English Bill of Rights of 1689 was not intended to outlaw barbarous methods of punishment. 9 He argues that it was intended to outlaw punishments "which were unauthorized by statute and outside
During the reign of protestant King Charles II, Titus Oates, a minister of the Church of England, announced that he had evidence of a plot to assassinate the King and thereby place Catholic James II on the throne. 20 Oates' story was a complete hoax, but as a result of his subsequent testimony, r, Id. at 860-65. 18 Id. at 857-58. '9 Id. at 844.
2o Oates testified that "two Jesuit priests were to shoot the King with silver bullets, four 'Irish Ruffians' had been hired to stab him, and if all failed, the Queen's doctor ... was to poison him." Id. at 857.
at least fifteen Catholics were executed for treason. 21 After James II succeeded to the throne in 1685, Oates was tried and convicted of perjury. Oates was sentenced to (1) a fine of 2,000 marks, (2) life imprisonment, (3) whippings, (4) pillorying four times a year, and (5) defrocking22
After William became the King of England in 1689, Oates petitioned Parliament for relief from his sentence. The House of Lords denied Oates' petition, but a minority report in the House of Lords and a majority in the House of Commons labeled Oates' punishment "cruel and unusual." ' 3 Granucci contends this was the only contemporary use of the phrase "cruel and unusual." He also argues that Oates' sentence was neither disproportionate for a person who had caused the death of many innocent persons, nor was it cruel and barbarous considering the contemporary standards2 Therefore, Granucci concludes that the phrase must prohibit a "severe punishment unauthorized by statute and not within the jurisdiction of the court to impose.
amercements.2 The most important of the three was that "[a] free man shall not be amerced for a trivial offence, except in accordance with the degree of the offence; and for a serious offence he shall be amerced according to its gravity., 29 Granucci concludes that by the year 1400, we have expression of "the long standing principle of English Law that the punishment should fit the crime. That is, the punishment should not be, by reason of its excessive length and severity, greatly disproportionate to the offense charged."
THE AMERICAN MISINTERPRETATION THEORY
Granucci asserts that by 1689, England prohibited punishments that were either excessive' or outside of a court's jurisdiction to impose. Granucci also states that England had never prohibited cruel methods of punishment.
3 2 Notwithstanding these assertions, Granucci contends that the American founders intended that the eighth amendment prohibit cruel methods of punishment.3 Granucci argues that this anomaly was a result of American misinterpretation of English law. Granucci contends that the prohibition against barbarous punishment is an American development largely invented by Nathaniel Ward.3 Ward drafted an early Massachusetts law known as the Body of Liberties. Included in this law is the clause, "For bodily punishments we allow amongst us none that are inhumane, barbarous or cruel." 2 35 The American framers, according to Granucci, intended to prohibit cruel methods of punishment and erroneously thought that the English Bill of Rights already did so. Granucci traces the confusion to a passage in Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England which states that "the bill of rights has particularly declared, that excessive fines ought not to be imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted: (which had a retrospect to some unprecedented proceedings in the court of King's Bench, in the reign of King James the second)." 36 Granucci argues that the Blackstone passage does not refer to the Bloody Assize because the 2 Id. at 845. 2 Id. at 846 (quoting J. HOLT, MAGNA CARTA 323 (1965) Bloody Assize was not a proceeding in the Court of King's Bench. 37 Instead, Granucci suggests that Blackstone refers to the trial of Titus Oates, discussed in a prior section. Granucci also notes that another passage in Blackstone contemplates cruel methods of punishment as legal without even mentioning the cruel and unusual punishment clause.3 CRITICISMS OF THE GRANUCCI THEORIES First, since Granucci admits that the American framers originally intended to prohibit cruel methods of punishment, one must question the relevance of his two proposed English meanings, even assuming they are correct. Was the American framers' desire to prohibit cruel methods of punishment any less legitimate because they misunderstood history? Similarly, should an English concept of proportionality have any force in causing an American court to alter an historically developed perception of the eighth amendment?
Second, Granucci's two English meanings can themselves be questioned. In his Sonnett Memorial Lecture, Judge Mulligan questioned Granucci's reliance on the trial of Titus Oates. Judge Mulligan argues that Oates' eventual release from prison was not attributable to concern that Oates had been subjected to cruel and unusual punishment but rather, was "an act of gratitude by William of Orange ... who knew his friends and recognized the instruments which helped him attain the throne of England.
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Granucci's contention that the English Bill of Rights of 1689 was meant to prohibit disproportionate punishments can also be criticized. The most obvious criticism is the fact that disproportionate punishment continued to occur with great frequency following enactment of the English Bill of Rights. According to Justice Marshall's concurring opinion in Furman v. Georgia, 4° in the year 1500 there were eight capital crimes. By the date of the English Bill of Rights, 1689, there were almost fifty capital crimes. By 1800, there were almost two hundred capital crimes, prohibiting a whole range of human activity.
4 1 Certainly, this is a powerful concept. Granucci's apparent answer to this is " [w] hether the principle was honored in practice ,,42 or not is an open question.
Finally, there is no causal connection between belief in the proportionality principle and the adoption of the English Bill of Rights. On the one hand, Granucci discounts the Bloody Assize explanation of the Bill of Rights because the assize was mentioned only once during the debates in Parliament. On the other hand, Granucci is unable to point to even one mention of a proportionality concept during parliamentary debate.
A SECOND HISTORICAL JUSTIFICATION FOR THE PROPORTIONALITY CONCEPT IN THE EIGHTH

AMENDMENT
In 1975, two student authors proposed an alter native historical justification for finding a proportionality requirement in the eighth amendment. 43 These authors accept the traditional historical explanation for the English Bill of Rights-that it prohibits cruel methods of punishment.4
4 They also accept the notion that the American framers intended to prohibit barbarous punishments.
4 5 But the authors assert that the American framers were also influenced by certain enlightenment thinkers, particularly the Italian writer Cesare Beccaria, who advocated proportionate punishments.
In 1764, Cesare Beccaria authored On Crimes and Punishments. 4 6 Beccaria's central thesis was that a punishment should relate to the seriousness of the crime. Two years later, Voltaire authored a Commentary on Beccaria's treatise which was translated along with the treatise into all the primary European languages. 47 The student authors contend that Beccaria's proportionality ideas were adopted in the eighth amendment because (1) Beccaria's work was widely read in early America; 48 (2) John Adams once quoted Beccaria in a speech to ajury while defending soldiers accused of the Boston Massacre; 49 (3) Thomas Jefferson read Beccaria and adopted his ideas of proportionality.'s Moreover, Jefferson attempted to introduce a more proportionate sentencing scheme in Virginia; (4) George Mason, the author of the Virginia Declaration of Rights, included a provision prohibiting cruel and unusual punishments.
5 ' Mason, the authors assert, was aware of Beccaria and agreed with his ideas; 52 (5) some states included provisions in their constitutions prohibiting disproportionate punishments;' and (6) the framers of the eighth amendment incorporated the state prohibitions against disproportionate punishments.
CRITICISM OF THE THESIS
Acceptance of the Beccaria thesis requires several giant assumptions of causal connection, all of which are contrary to historical evidence.
First, one cannot find a causal connection between Beccaria's work and the known history on the eighth amendment. Merely proving that Thomas Jefferson read and agreed with Beccaria proves nothing about the eighth amendment. Jefferson was a widely read man; certainly no one has seriously argued that all that he read was adopted by reference in the Constitution.
Second, the student authors' critical assumption is illogical. The authors assert that George Mason thought the eighth amendment meant to prohibit disproportionate punishments, and yet the authors admit that Mason used the exact words of the English Bill of Rights of 1689. The authors suggest that this "may have been merely [a] linguistic device." 5 Certainly, the authors' burden is to present a more powerful explanation than that the words with a fixed historical meaning may have been selected in error. The authors of the state constitutions knew precisely how to prohibit disproportionate punishments and clearly did so.5 50Id. at 818: The authors call Jefferson the "medium through which the Enlightenment ideas were put to practical use .. and... [the] 
connecting link between
Beccaria and what was to become the eighth amendment." Id. at 816.
51 Id. at 819-20.
52Id.
Id. at 823-25.
'4Id. at 830.
Id. at 820.
H6Id. at 820-25. See, e.g., N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. 18, which directed that:
All penalties ought to be proportioned to the nature of the offense. No wise legislature will affix the same punishment to the crimes of theft, forgery and the like, which they do to those of murder and treason;
where the same undistinguishing severity is exerted against all offenses, the people are led to forget the
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Yet, the framers of the Bill of Rights did not adopt the language of these provisions. Third, although the debates on the adoption of the eighth amendment are not detailed, what little evidence there is clearly centers around a concern to prevent the national government from initiating barbarous methods of punishment. In Virginia, George Mason 57 and Patrick Henry 5 8 both spoke of the necessity to prohibit the government from using torture. In Massachusetts, a delegate spoke of the same necessity. 59 Finally, one may accept the authors' historical real distinction in the crimes themselves, and to commit the most flagrant with as little compunction as they do those of the lightest dye: For the same reason a multitude of sanguinary laws is both impolitic and unjust. The true design of all punishments being to reform, not to exterminate, mankind. While the student authors contend that the framers of the Bill of Rights intended to incorporate such proportionality concepts, they can show no causal connection in the relevant debates.
57 George Mason stated: For that one clause expressly provided that no man can give evidence against himself and that ... in those countries where torture is used, evidence was extorted from the criminal himself. Another clause of the bill of rights provided, that no cruel and unusual punishments shall be inflicted; therefore torture was included in the prohibition. 3 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE MASON 1085 (R. Rutland ed. 1970), cited in Comment, supra note 43, at 828.
5 Patrick Henry said in opposition to the pre-Bill of Rights Constitution:
In this business of legislation, your members of Congress will loose the restriction of not imposing fines, demanding excessive bail, and inflicting cruel and unusual punishments. These are prohibited by your declaration of rights. What has distinguished our ancestors? That they would not admit of tortures, or cruel and barbarous punishment. But Congress may introduce the practice of the civil law in preference to that of the common law ... of torturing to extort a confession of crime. 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE CONSTITUTION 447-48 (J. Elliott ed. 1901) , cited in Comment, supra note 43, at 828-29 n.216. 59 The delegate stated in the Massachusetts Convention:
What gives an additional glare of horror to these gloomy circumstances is the consideration, that Congress have to ascertain, point out, and determine what kind of punishments shall be inflicted on persons convicted of crimes. They are nowhere restrained from inventing the most cruel and unheard of punishments, and annexing them to crimes; and there is no constitutional check on them, but that racks and gibbets may be amongst the most mild instruments of their discipline. Massachusetts Convention Debates, Jan. 30, 1788, at 111, cited in Comment, supra note 43, at 828 n.214. interpretation in total and still legitimately question the authors' conclusion that such proofjustifies active judicial interference with legislatively selected punishments. This is an argument discussed in some detail later in this article.
HISTORICAL CONCLUSION
To the extent that we need to know "the discoverable intentions of those who wrote and ratified" 6 the eighth amendment, we can fairly doubt the conclusion of Granucci and the student authors. The traditional view that the eighth amendment was meant to prohibit only cruel methods of punishment retains its vitality. Of course, rejection of their thesis provides only a starting point for analysis. The next section traces the evolution of the eighth amendment in the Supreme Court. [Vol. 71 essary cruelty, are forbidden by that amendment to the Constitution."
66 Since death by firing squad was a common mode of military execution, the Court had no difficulty in upholding it as a constitutional method of punishment.
The third eighth amendment case to reach the Supreme Court involved a New York prisoner who argued that electrocution was an impermissible method of punishment. 67 Since the Supreme Court plainly held in Pervear that the eighth amendment applied only to the national government, it is difficult to understand why the Court found it necessary to address the eighth amendment argument in this state case. Nevertheless, the Court did address the eighth amendment question under the rubric of the fourteenth amendment due process clause.
8
In In re Kemmler, the Court again adopted the traditional rationale that the eighth amendment was meant to prohibit "burning at the stake, crucifixion, breaking on the wheel, or the like.", 69 The Court held that a punishment is cruel and unusual if it involves "something inhuman and barbarous. ' , 70 Although electrocution was unusual in the sense that it was not an historical punishment, the unquestioned good motive of the New York 661d. at 16. The "commentator referred to" was Blackstone. Granucci makes a convincing argument that the court misread Blackstone on this score. The Supreme Court correctly described Blackstone, 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 7, at * 377:
Such is the general statement of that commentator, but he admits that in very atrocious crimes other circumstances of terror, pain, or disgrace were sometimes superadded. Cases mentioned by the author are, where the prisoner was drawn or dragged to the place of execution, in treason; or where he was disembowelled alive, beheaded, and quartered, in high treason. Mention is also made of public dissection in murder, and burning alive in treason committed by a female. History confirms the truth of these atrocities, but the commentator states that the humanity of the nation by tacit consent allowed the mitigation of such parts of those judgments as savored of torture or cruelty, and he states that they were seldom strictly carried into effect. 99 U.S. at 135.
While the description of the Blackstone passage is accurate, it is important to note that Blackstone never states that these punishments were improper, nor does this section cite the English Bill of Rights of 1689. Granucci argues that the American founders misinterpreted this section of Blackstone as saying that cruel and unusual punishments were prohibited by the English Bill of Rights and by adoption, the eighth amendment. legislature in selecting that method of execution saved it from constitutional attack.
The next important mention of the eighth amendment in the Supreme Court came in Justice Field's dissenting opinion in O 'Neil v. Vermont. 71 O'Neil was a New York liquor merchant who had :been convicted of 307 distinct offenses for selling liquor illegally in the state of Vermont. He was fined $20.00 for each offense along with $497.96 in prosecution expenses. If O'Neil would be unable to pay the fine, he was to serve out the fine at $3.00 a day, over 54 years at hard labor. O'Neil argued that under the commerce clause, Vermont could not constitutionally make the sale of goods by a nonresident to residents a penal offense. The Supreme Court dismissed O'Neil's application for writ of error stating that no federal question had been properly presented.
In a twenty-nine-page dissent, Justice Field argued for twenty-four pages that a federal question had been properly presented and that Vermont had no constitutional power to make O'Neil's conduct criminal. Despite O'Neil's failure to argue to the Court that his punishment violated constitutional guarantees, Justice Field also argued that the fiftyfour-year sentence violated the eighth amendment. Justice Field accepted the notion that the eighth amendment was designed to prohibit "punishments which inflict torture, such as the rack, the thumb-screw, the iron boot, the stretching of limbs, and the like."
72 However, he asserted that the eighth amendment also outlawed "all punishments which by their excessive length or severity are greatly disproportioned to the offences charged. 73 Justice Field determined that the fifty-four-year sentence was unconstitutional for the underlying offense because it was extremely severe and it was greater than the punishment Vermont exacts for burglary or highway robbery and six times greater than Vermont's punishment for manslaughter, forgery, or perjury. 74 Justice Field rejected the argument that O'Neil's sentence was justified as a cumulative sentence for many separate offences, because the sentence was "greatly beyond anything required by any humane law for the offence."
The first attempt to test Justice Field's O'Neil dissent in the Supreme Court was Howard v. North Carolina. 7 In Howard, two defendants were given ten-year sentences and one defendant was given a seven-year sentence for conspiracy to defraud. The defendants argued that the sentences were unconstitutionally severe under the eighth amendment. In rejecting the argument, Justice Brewer stated, " [t] 79 Id. at 363.
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The Court described the specifics of the sentence as including:
A. Imprisonment for 15 years during which time the prisoner shall always carry a chain at the ankle and attached to the wrists. The prisoner shall be employed at hard and painful labor and shall receive no assistance whatsoever from outside the prison. B. Accessory penalties:
1. Civil interdiction-Defendant has no rights of parental authority, guardianship of person or property, of participation in the family council, of marital authority, of administration of property, and to dispose of personal property by act intervivos. Second, the condition of imprisonment may have been so poor as to render his sentence unconstitutional. During his imprisonment, Weems served under cadena temporal. He had his hands and feet chained and performed hard and painful labor. Additionally, Weems was allowed no outside contact.s Third, the post-imprisonment effects of the sentence may render it unconstitutional. The Weems Court describes the disabilities long attached to the punishment:
He is forever kept under the shadow of his crime, forever kept within voice and view of the criminal magistrate, not being able to change his domicil without giving notice to the "authority immediately in charge of his surveillance," and without permission in writing. He may not seek, even in other scenes and among other people, to retrieve in full from rectitude. Even that hope is taken from him and he is subject to tormenting regulations that, if not so tangible as iron bars and stone walls, oppress as much by their continuity, and deprive of essential liberty. No circumstance of degradation is omitted.' Fourth, the Weems Court may have viewed the punishment as a combination of the three factors mentioned above: (1) length of sentence; (2) condition of imprisonment; and (3) post-imprisonment (accessories of) punishment. This combination theory most logically explains Weems because the individual factors, judged by the standards of the day, did not amount to cruel and unusual punish- 88 Id. at 366. In speaking of this condition, the Court stated:
It may be that even the cruelty of pain is not omitted. He must bear a chain night and day. He is condemned to painful as well as hard labor. What painful labor may mean we have no exact measure. It must be something more than hard labor. It may be hard labor, pressed to the point of pain. Id. 89 Id. In addition to the vivid description of the "accessory" punishment, the Supreme Court discussed whether the accessory punishment could be severed from the imprisonment so as to make the punishment constitutional. The Court held that the postimprisonment punishment could not be severed. Id. at 381-82. Significantly, the Court would not have had to contemplate this possibility if the prison sentence standing alone had constituted cruel and unusual punishment. This discounts the mere length of sentence explanation of Weems. ment. In Howard v. North Carolina, 90 a unanimous Supreme Court rejected an eighth amendment attack on a ten-year sentence for conspiracy to defraud. It is doubtful that the additional five-year sentence for the Weems offense accounts for the differing decisions in Weems and Howard.
The fact that at the time of Weems the federal courts had long maintained a hands-off policy in prison affairs, 9 ' militates against the argument that Weems was strictly a condition-of-servitude case. There is no suggestion in the Court's opinion that the conditions imposed on Weems were per se unconstitutional. The Court's analysis proceeds from the proposition that the conditions imposed on Weems were improper, not that the conditions themselves were improper.
Finally, the post-imprisonment punishments differ only in degree from disabilities imposed today for conviction of a felony and conditions imposed for discretionary parole. Inability to hold public office and loss of franchise frequently accompany convictions of a felony.
These factors demonstrate that the most reasonable reading of Weems is that the various factors discussed coalesced in both condition and intensity of punishment to violate the eighth amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. It would be unfair to characterize Weems as merely holding that the sentence selected by the Philippine Court was disproportionate as to length. It would be equally unfair to characterize the Weems result in terms of the conditions of punishment. Perhaps, the uncertainty surrounding Weems explains why the Weems case never became the foundation for a developed eighth amendment proportionality doctrine.
Another possible reason for the Weems failure to take hold is the exceptionally powerful dissent of Justice White. 92 In his dissent, Justice White read the majority opinion as requiring proportional punishments. 93 His reading is, of course, a product of the dissenter's right of exaggeration, but it none- " See Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119, 139 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quot-theless served as a vehicle for an historical view of the meaning of the eighth amendment. According to Justice White, the primary purpose of the eighth amendment in history was to prevent barbarous methods of punishment: "It may not be doubted, and indeed is not questioned by anyone, that the cruel punishments against which the [Bill of [R] ights provided were the atrocious, sanguinary and inhuman punishments which had been inflicted in the past upon the persons of criminals." 4 Justice White also thought that the eighth amendment prohibited courts from ordering punishments that were beyond their jurisdiction. He agreed on this point with the Granucci thesis and, in fact, both Granucci and Justice White point to the trial of Titus Oates as an explanation for this second meaning of the eighth amendment.
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In sharp disagreement with the Granucci thesis, however, Justice White argued that proportional punishments were not required by the English Bill of Rights. For proof of this proposition, Justice White relied on the English methods of punishment from the 1600s through the American Revolution.9 Justice White quoted Stephen on the severity of English law: "there can be no doubt that the legislation of the eighteenth century in criminal matters was severe to the highest degree, and destitute of any sort of principle or system." ' 7 Justice White argued that the American framers were fully aware of the harsh nature of prevailing English law. Even so, they chose to adopt the wording of the English Bill of Rights prohibiting cruel and unusual punishments. 1119-20 (1979) , the student author suggests that the lack of a fuller development of Weems is not surprising because the vast majority of challenges to length of sentences do not rise to a constitutional level.
'0o 240 U. S. 391 (1916 The Chief Justice argued that it is empirically impossible" 5 3 to prove this proposition. In addition, he stated that putting the burden of justifying a punishment on the state could result in destruction of the corrections system because no proof could show that the legislatively selected punishment is "a more effective deterrent" 1 " than all other punishments.
One commentator has aptly described Furman as a remand to the states.
1 The reaction was decisive. Within four years of Furman, thirty-five states and the United States Congress passed laws providing for the death penalty.
1 " This reaction undermined the "standards of decency" argument posited by Justices Marshall and Brennan.
In Gregg v. Georgia, 5 7 seven Justices approved the death penalty against an eighth amendment attack.l58 The plurality opinion for the Court recognized the proportionality principle, but it clearly held that the death penalty for murder was not 149 408 U.S. at 460 (Powell, J., dissenting). In the last Term the Supreme Court decided three death penalty cases. Two of these cases are relatively unimportant. In Beck v. Alabama, 100 S. Ct. 2382 Ct. (1980 , the Supreme Court held that Alabama could not constitutionally prohibit a jury from considering possible guilt to a lesser included offense raised by the evidence. Since Alabama juries were charged that they must either return a guilty verdict to the capital offense charged or set the defendant completely free, the similarity of Alabama procedure with the mandatory death penalties disapproved in Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U. S. 280 (1976), and Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976) , is striking. In Adams v. Texas, 100 S. Ct. 2521 Ct. (1980 , the Court applied Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968) , to a Texas statute that excluded jurors because they were unable to take an oath that the mandatory penalty of death or life imprisonment would not "affect [their] deliberations on any issue of fact."
The important eighth amendment case in the Court involving the death penalty during the last term is Godfrey v. Georgia, 100 S. Ct. 1759 Ct. (1980 . In Godfrey, a plurality opinion held that the Georgia Supreme Court adopted an overly broad and vague definition of the Georgia capital murder statute that makes "outrageous or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman" murder punishable by death by affirming a death sentence imposed on a defendant who deliberately and methodically murdered his wife and mother-in-law with a shot gun. Godfrey raises the distressing spectre that the Supreme Court might individually determine the facts in every death penalty case. Also in that case, the Court refused an opportunity Following the death penalty cases, the eighth amendment appeared in the Supreme Court in a more mundane posture. In Ingraham v. Wright, 68 a class of Florida students alleged that corporal punishment in state supported schools deprived them of their eighth amendment rights. Since it had become accepted that corporal punishment in prisons 16 7 violated the eighth amendment, it would seem a small step to outlaw corporal punishment in schools. The Supreme Court rejected the analogy, holding that the eighth amendment protected only those convicted of a crime.' 6 8 Ingraham is also important for proportionality purposes because it is the first opinion with a clear majority of Justices' 69 to unambiguously recognize a proportionality element under the eighth amendment.
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Another important eighth amendment case in the Supreme Court involved the long-standing objection to the death penalty for rape. In Coker v. Georgia,' a prisoner serving a life sentence for two rapes, kidnapping, aggravated assault, and murder escaped from confinement and raped a third woman. The prisoner was convicted of the third rape and sentenced to death under a Georgia statute that allowed the death penalty for rape under three specific aggravating circumstances:
(1) that the rape was committed by a person with a prior record of conviction for a capital felony;
to find the death penalty a disproportionate punishment for a domestic slaying occurring under emotionally charged circumstances and ruled instead that the Georgia Statute was unconstitutionally vague. [Vol. 71 (2) that the rape was committed while the offender was engaged in the commission of another capital felony, or aggravated battery; or (3) that the rape was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or aggravated battery of the victim.
1
In Coker the jury found the first two aggravating circumstances: that Coker had committed the rape after having been convicted of a capital felony, and that he had committed the rape in the course of another capital felony-armed robbery. The third possible aggravating circumstance, torture to the victim, was not charged because the Coker rape did not involve physical torture other than the agony of the rape itself.
When considering the question before the Court, the Coker plurality'" 3 refused to view Coker's crime as "rape plus." First, the plurality held that Coker's other convictions "do not change the fact that the instant crime being punished is a rape not involving the taking of a life."' 4 Second, the Court discounted the second aggravating circumstancerape accompanied by armed robbery-because the jury returned only a life sentence for the separate armed robbery offense. 75 Finally, the plurality stated that any uncharged aggravating circumstance also would fail to change the character of the rape because "it would seem that the defendant could very likely be convicted, tried, and appropriately punished for this additional conduct.',
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'7 433 U.S. at 598-99. '"Justice White authored the Court's opinion, joined by Justices Stewart, Blackmun, and Stevens. Justices Brennan and Marshall filed separate concurring opinions on per se grounds. Justice Powell filed a concurring and dissenting opinion. Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justice Rehnquist, filed a dissenting opinion.
1'74 433 U.S. at 599. 17 ld. Coker was also tried for armed robbery. The aggravating circumstance of that felony was Coker's prior capital conviction. The jury returned a life sentence on the armed robbery count. Apparently the Court did not consider whether or not a jury could logically find that rape with a past conviction for murder was more serious than armed robbery with a prior conviction for murder.
Perhaps a more logical explanation for the Court's action is alluded to in a footnote. In Gregg v. Georgia, 233 Ga. 117, 210 S.E.2d 659 (1974 Ga. 117, 210 S.E.2d 659 ( ), affid, 428 U.S. 153 (1976 , the Supreme Court of Georgia refused to sustain a death sentence for armed robbery, apparently because it was excessive. Since the second aggravating circumstance in Coker was the capital offense of armed robbery, it is odd that armed robbery, while not a permissible capital offense, is a permissible aggravating circumstance under a death penalty law that requires rape plus another capital felony. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. at 599 n.15.
176 433 U.S. at 599-600 n.16.
Since the plurality of the Court was not willing to consider that the Coker rape affected societal interests different from a mere physical rape, the Supreme Court addressed the question of whether the death penalty for rape is per se unconstitutionally disproportionate under the eighth amendment.
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Writing for the plurality, Justice White stated that according to Gregg v. Georgia, a punishment is excessively cruel under the eighth amendment if the punishment "is grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime."' 78 In deciding Coker, Justice
White examined the incidence of the death penalty in jurisdictions throughout the United States to determine if the punishment was grossly disproportional. According to the opinion, in 1925 eighteen states, the District of Columbia, and the federal government authorized the death penalty for rape. 7 9 Just prior to the decision in Furman v.
Georgia, the number of jurisdictions had declined to sixteen states and the federal government.
18
After Furman invalidated all the existing death penalty statutes, thirty-five states and the federal government re-enacted the death penalty for certain offenses. However, out of the thirty-six jurisdictions responding to Furman, only three included rape of an adult woman as a capital felonyGeorgia, North Carolina, and Louisiana.1 8 ' After the entire death penalty apparatus of North Carolina and Louisiana was declared unconstitutional in Woodson v. North Carolina and Robert v. Louisiana, the legislatures of those states enacted death penalty statutes for crimes other than rape.' 8 2 After completing his survey, Justice White concluded that "Georgia is the sole jurisdiction in the United States at the present time that authorizes a sentence of death when the rape victim is an adult woman." ' 83 Since the legislative response to Furman was a "marked indication of society's endorsement of the death penalty for murder,"' 4 Justice White concluded that the legislative failure to include 177 In terms of the order of the actual opinion, Justice White addressed the death-for-rape question first and then added that the additional circumstance did not make a difference. I have reversed the order for discussion because it appears to be analytically more sound to address the individual circumstance before addressing the broad question.
178 433 U.S. at 592. 
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In addition to comparing the jurisdictional response to Furman, Justice White canvassed the willingness of Georgian juries to impose the death penalty for a rape.ss 8 According to the plurality opinion, Georgiajuries returned the death sentence in only six of the sixty-three rape cases reviewed by the Georgia Supreme Court.1 8 7
Justice White viewed this fact as evidence that juries, and therefore the community judgment, viewed the death penalty as disproportionate for rape. Finally, Justice White argued that the Court's "own judgment" determined that the death penalty was disproportionate for a rape conviction.'88
Justice Powell wrote a separate opinion in which he concurred in part and dissented in part.
189 Justice Powell agreed with the plurality opinion that the eighth amendment prohibited Coker's execution for the two aggravating circumstances present in the case, (1) rape committed by someone with a prior capital conviction, and (2) rape committed while the offender was engaged in another capital felony. Justice Powell disagreed, however, with the Court's conclusion that the death penalty could never be imposed for the third category-aggravated or physically abusive rape. Justice Powell argued that an "outrageous rape resulting in serious, lasting harm to the victim" ' 0 could be constitutionally punished by death. Justice Powell examined the character of the offense, but not the character of the offender. Chief Justice Burger, in a dissent joined by Justice Rehnquist, took issue with the plurality's decision to limit consideration of Coker's death sentence to the rape charge rather than considering rape plus aggravating circumstances.' 9 ' The Chief Justice pointed to various recidivist statutes as examples of enhanced punishment not directed against the seriousness of an isolated offense but directed against a "well-d, nonstrated propensity for life endangering beha-ior. Does the Eighth Amendment's ban against cruel and unusual punishment prohibit the State of Georgia from executing a person who has, within the space of three years, raped three separate women, killing one and attempting to kill another, who is serving prison terms exceeding his probable life time, and who has not hesitated to escape confinement at the first available opportunity?
Next, the Chief Justice took issue with the reasoning used by the plurality in determining that Georgia was the only American jurisdiction to punish the rape of an adult woman with death. The Chief Justice argued that the pre-Furman catalogue of states was a more accurate indicator of societal attitudes toward the appropriate punishment for rape than the frenzied post-Furman activity.'
9 ' Since at least two Justices in Furman expressed the opinion that mandatory penalties were constitutionally appropriate, many legislatures believed their alternatives to be abolishing the death penalty for rape or making it mandatory. Given this choice, and the probable fact that most legislators would not favor a mandatory death penalty for all rapes, the reaction seems predictable. Finally, the Chief Justice challenged the plurality's judgment that the death penalty is disproportionate to the crime of rape.
1 ' He argued that rape is, short of homicide, the ultimate violation of self 197 and that there is no eighth amendment requirement that a penalty be directly proportionate to the crime. Therefore, the Chief Justice concluded that a legislature might logically select a penalty one step "more severe than the criminal act it punishes."'9 owever, as this section demonstrates, the habitual offender laws have been generously received by the Supreme Court. The numerous attacks on these statutes include (1) due process, (2) equal protection, (3) cruel and unusual punishment, (4) the procedure used in the enhancement of punishment, and (5) the use of these statutes in plea bargaining. Each attempt at the habitual offender statute has failed in the Supreme Court.
The first appearance of an habitual offender statute in the Supreme Court was in Moore v. Missouri. 20 ' In Moore, the defendant had been convicted of grand larceny in 1887 and served a threeyear sentence. After being released from the Missouri penitentiary, Moore was convicted of burglary in the second degree and sentenced to life imprisonment under the Missouri habitual criminal statute. Moore argued that the statute violated the constitutional provisions that prohibit double jeopardy and cruel and unusual punishments and guarantee equal protection of the laws. The Moore Court clearly thought that the double jeopardy argument was the most substantial one. The Court determined that the punishment did not result in a second punishment for the first offense but resulted from an enhancement or aggravation of the punishment for the second offense.
2°s Along with this holding the Court merely said that "the increase of his punishment by reason of the commission of the first offense was not cruel and unusual.
' '°T he above half-sentence addressing the cruel and unusual punishment argument can be read as stating that enhancement for a second offense does not violate the eighth amendment. The sentence need not be read as approving a life sentence under the habitual offender law against a disproportion- The fifth assignment is to the effect that the punishment provided by the statute is cruel and unusual punishment, and is contrary to article 5 of the amendments to the constitution of the United
States, and to article 26 of the declaration of rights.... Ordinarily, the terms "cruel and unusual" imply something inhuman and barbarous in the nature of the punishment. In re Kemnler, supra. But it is possible that imprisonment in the state prison for a long term of years might be so disproportionate to the offense as to constitute a cruel and unusual punishment. However, that may be, it cannot be held, we think, that the punishment is "cruel and unusual," where the statute provides, as it does here [statute described]. The penalty was determined, no doubt, by the view that in such a case the criminal habit has become so fixed and the hope of reformation is so slight that the safety of society requires and justifies a long-continued imprisonment of the offender. The statute provides, however,
that if it appears to the governor and council at any time that the convict has reformed, they may release him conditionally for the residue of the term. 173 Mass. at 328-29, 53 N.E. at 875. This state court opinion is important for two reasons: First, it was the first state court decision to unambiguously admit that a sentence can be disproportionate under the eighth amendment merely because of length; and second, for purposes of the court's analysis, the court was willing to mitigate the harshness of the statute by the possibility of discretionary release. [Vol. 71 opinion, one can infer that Justice Powell thought the application of the habitual criminal act disproportionate. The habitual criminal cases make clear that in this area, unlike the death penalty, the Supreme Court has shown no special solicitude for the eighth amendment argument.
THE DISPROPORTIONALITY ARGUMENT IN THE LOWER COURTS
The disproportionality argument has been made in almost every American jurisdiction and has been met with near universal hostility. Only a few exceptional cases have interdicted prison sentences as impermissibly long under the eighth amendment, and a few cases have interfered with prison sentences under a theory akin to the disproportionality argument.
This section examines several early cases often called the first disproportionality cases. It will demonstrate that factors other than the proportionality argument influenced these cases. Next, it examines the handful of states that have accepted the proportionality argument and have actually found a prison term excessively long under the eighth amendment. The state experience under the disproportionality theory will then be examined. Finally, it analyzes contemporary developments in the federal courts under the proportionality argument.
EARLY CASES State v. DriverHS is frequently cited as the first instance of a court rejecting a prison sentence under a proportionality concept. Driver was convicted of the common law crime' of wifebeating and sentenced to five years in the county jail and was required to post a $500 peace bond. The North Carolina Supreme Court found Driver's punishment excessive because his sentence was "greater than has ever been prescribed or known"23 and therefore must be "excessive, cruel and unusual" ' in violation of the North Carolina Constitution.=5
While one reading of Driver supports the proportionality Loncept, a different meaning becomes Read in conjunction with Miller, State v. Driver is logically explained as a condition of confinement case and not a proportionality case addressing only the length of punishment. This conclusion is buttressed by later cases from the North Carolina Supreme Court flatly refusing to recognize any power under the eighth amendment or the state constitution to review the lengths of prison sentences.= Another early case frequently thought to support the proportionality concept is also inapposite. In State ex rel. Garvey v. Whitaker,' 9 three defendants were convicted in municipal court of seventy-two counts of destroying plants in a New Orleans public square. The trial judge sentenced the defendants to pay a $10 fine for each offense or in lieu of the $720 fine serve thirty days for each offense, about six years total. The Louisiana Supreme Court held that any punishment in excess of a $25 fine or alternative imprisonment in excess of thirty days violated the state's constitution3 0 because the constitutional limits of punishment were coterminous with the jurisdictional limit of the municipal court. Viewed in this light, Garvey merely establishes the jurisdictional limits of the municipal court. At present, the Louisiana Supreme Court accepts the proportionality concept, but it has never reduced a sentence under this theory. Calhoun, a black man had been convicted of raping a white woman "who associated mainly with ... negroes" and was sentenced to death. In reversing the conviction and ordering a new trial, the court said that the evidence was not sufficient for conviction and the emotions of the jury may have constituted the deciding factor.
On petition for rehearing the state argued that it had presented all the evidence it could and asked the court to either hold that the evidence was insufficient or affirm the death penalty. 2 -In overruling the motion for rehearing, the court mentioned the state's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments for the first time 2 36 and reasoned that since the court has the power to rule on the sufficiency of the evidence, it must also have the power to assess the appropriateness of the punishment selected. It is truly remarkable that a woman physically strong, weighing 120 pounds, and knowing herself to be in such easy calling distance of so many people, in the daytime, without apparently any tears or excitement, could be raped by a negro. Appellant was without money or friends, and the trial court appointed counsel to defend him. He was given the death sentence, and the case had been pending in this court many months when the writer of the opinion came upon the bench. We have carefully considered the record in all its different aspects. We are fully aware of the feeling that exists in the breast of every white man for the sanctity of the home, and the virtue of woman, when he hears that a black man is charged with an offense of this character against a white woman. We believe that grave care should be exercised in such a case lest the judgment be swayed by passion. The character of prosecutrix, the peculiar circumstances surrounding the case, the severity of the penalty, are matters that appeal to us with such force as to cause us to deem it best to let anotherjury pass on the facts. In Kimbrough the defendant was convicted of a burglary in which he stole a watch and chain. South Carolina law provided for a life sentence upon conviction of a burglary, or a penalty of not less than five years if the jury recommends mercy. The jury recommended mercy and the trial judge sentenced the defendant to thirty years imprisonment. The court could have found that the thirty-year sentence violated the spirit of the mercy recommendation but the court chose to review the sentence under the cruel and unusual punishment rubric.
[ death for rape, 2 s five years for distributing oneseventh of an ounce of marijuana, 2 9 and ten years for safecracking.250
In 1975, the South Carolina Supreme Court considered a proportionality attack made by a twenty-year-old defendant convicted of distributing one-seventh of an ounce of marijuana and sentenced to five years in prison.2s
t Over the dissent of a single justice, the court made no mention of the disproportionality analysis and stated, "We have held that this Court has no jurisdiction to disturb, because of alleged excessiveness, a sentence which is within the limits prescribed by law. Carolina Supreme Court returned to disproportionality analysis in upholding a ten-year z s sentence for safecracking. The court explained that safecracking carries a greater minimum penalty than many violent crimes because safecracking is a crime that demonstrates great deliberation.255
The court reasoned that since the jury had recommended mercy and the burglary was not accompanied by any aggravating factors, the thirty-year sentence constituted a tyrannical punishment. , a companion case to Lorentzen, the Michigan Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a nineand-one-half-year sentence for possession of marijuana. In a bizarre set of opinions, two judges of the Michigan Supreme Court held that categorizing marijuana as a narcotic violated equal protection; two judges held that the defendant was entrapped; two judges held that the nine-and-one-half-year minimum sentence was unconstitutionally harsh; and one judge held that the law prohibiting possession of marijuana violated "fundamental rights to liberty and the pursuit of happiness" as explained by John S. Mill in his On Liberty.
Given the two ambiguous cases in the Michigan Supreme Court, it immediately split the lower Michigan courts until the Michigan Supreme Court summarily adopted the view that the marijuana statute was unconstitutional on the questions of possession or attempted possession. Compare People v. Griffin, 39 Mich. App. 464, 198 N.W.2d 21 (1972) Despite the apparent holding of Lorentzen that a mandatory penalty of twenty years for a nonviolent offense was unconstitutional, the lower Michigan courts were unanimous in refusing to strike down long sentences for other than marijuana offenses.
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26id. 26 Id. The court cited three law review articles for this proposition, without further explanation. "Experts on penology and criminal corrections tend to be of the opinion that, except for extremely serious crimes or unusually disturbed persons, the goal of rehabilitating offenders with maximum effectiveness can best be reached by short sentences of less than five years imprisonment." Id.
267 "A compulsory prison sentence of twenty years for a nonviolent crime imposed without consideration for defendant's individual personality and history is so excessive that it 'shocks the conscience."' Id. Mich. App. 295, 210 N.W.2d 501 (1973) , the same court upheld a 20-to 30-year sentence for a $10 sale of heroin.
The Michigan Supreme Court agreed with the lower court's reading of Lorentzen in People v. Stewart, 400 Mich. 540, 256 N.W.2d 31 (1977) . In Stewart the court upheld the mandatory 20-year minimum for sale of heroin with the statement, "We are not prepared to extend our holding in Lorentzen to heroin." Id. at 554, 265 N.W.2d at 36. In Stewart, Justice Kavanagh did not explain why sale of heroin was not protected under the pursuit of happiness theory announced in his opinions in Sinclair and Lorentzen.
The proportionality argument met with similar hostility in other areas. In People v. Bullock, 48 Mich. App. 700, 211 N.W.2d 108 (1973) , a Michigan appellate court upheld a three-and-one-half to four-year sentence for the theft of four sirloin steaks against proportionality attack. The same court upheld a statute that provided for up to a life sentence for "bank, safe and vault robbery" in People v. Ferguson, 60 Mich App. 302, 230 N.W.2d 406 (1975) . Another Michigan court upheld a mandatory life sentence for first degree felony murder against a proportionality attack in People v. Moore, 51 Mich. App. 48, Calirnia For many years California had an unusual sntencing system. For many crimes the punishment upon conviction was a sentence of "not less than one year." 26 9 For other crimes, the sentence was indeterminate within a broad range. For example, the punishment for assault with intent to commit murder was imprisonment from one to fourteen years.°S uperimposed on the indeterminate sentencing scheme were various provisions of the California Code which denied parole for a selected period of time. For example, a second offender guilty of furnishing heroin would be sentenced to an indeterminate ten years to life, and in addition, would not be eligible for parole until ten years of the sentence was served.'
The California Supreme Court has adopted proportionality analysis to test the various provisions against the strictures outlawing cruel and unusual punishment. The California courts have developed three distinct doctrines. The first doctrine tests the indeterminate sentence gauged by the maximum sentence permitted by the statute.
2 72 The second doctrine tests the sentences hierarchically. Because of the unusual sentencing scheme, it was sometimes possible for a defendant to be acquitted of a major offense which carried a maximum term of years but be convicted of a lesser included offense that carried an indeterminate lifetime sentence. Rptr. 217, 222 (1973) .
272 See, e.g., People v. Schuren, where the defendant was acquitted of the charge of assault with intent to murder, but convicted of the "lesser and necessarily included offense" of assault with a deadly weapon. The [Vol. 71 third doctrine tests the legality of the "no parole" provision apart from the constitutionality of the underlying sentence.
2 74 In the following sections, the California cases under the three doctrines are examined.
For many years California followed the traditional view that a sentence within the legislatively selected range did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment because of its length. In Ex Parte Rosencrantz2 75 the California Supreme Court upheld a mandatory life sentence, without the possibility of parole, that had been imposed on a woman convicted of passing fictitious checks on four occasions. The California view changed dramatically in In re Lynch. 276 California punishes first offense indecent exposure as a simple misdemeanor. The second offense, however, is a felony carrying an indeterminate sentence of "not less than one year." 2 7 In Lynch, a second offender under this statute argued that his sentence was unconstitutionally excessive. While the Lynch opinion is not the first proportionality case, it is the first case to develop a series of working propositions to test for a sentence's excessiveness. First, the court examined the nature of the offense and the offender with particular regard to the degree of danger each presents to society. 27 8 Second,
the Lynch court compared the punishments imposed in California for more serious offenses than principal, charge carried a maximum term of fourteen years while the lesser charge carried the lifetime indeterminate sentence. In Schuren, the California Supreme Court ruled that any sentence in excess of the 14-year maximum sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment. Earlier in this article, it was pointed out that the Lorentzen opinion contained passages much broader than the question presented in the Lorentzen case. In Lorentzen, the Michigan Supreme Court stated: "A compulsory prison sentence of twenty years for a non-violent crime imposed without consideration for defendant's individual personality and history is so excessive that it 'shocks the conscience.' " 387 Mich. at 181, 194 N.W.2d at 834.
The California Supreme Court added: "The provision precluding consideration for parole for the minimum term of ten years without consideration for either the offender or his offense is no less shocking." 10 Cal. 3d at 923, 519 P.2d at 1081, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 657.
Another passage of Lorentzen adds: "Experts on penology and criminal corrections tend to be of the opinion that, except for extremely serious crimes or unusually disturbed persons, the goal of rehabilitating offenders with maximum effectiveness can best be reached by short sentences of less than five years imprisonment." 387 Mich. at 181, 194 N.W.2d at 833.
The California Supreme Court held: "Thus, where rehabilitation of the offender is of primary importance, the mandatory provision precluding parole consideration for the ten-year minimum period as provided by section 11501 is clearly excessive." 10 Cal. 3d at 924, 519 P.2d at 1081, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 657.
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Lynch.29 The California Supreme Court followed with another case. In In re GrantP' the defendant was convicted of the sale of marijuana. He had twice before been convicted of narcotics violations and was sentenced to serve ten years to life without possibility of parole for ten years. Instead of reviewing the particularized sentence charged to Grant, the court reviewed the "entire scheme of... precluding parole consideration for recidivist narcotic offenders."2 ' The court then determined that the California provisions which preclude parole considerations for a minimum of five or more years for recidivist narcotic offenders constituted cruel and unusual punishment. Court of Appeals determined that a life sentence without the possibility of parole imposed on two fourteen-year-old boys for the rape of a seventyone-year-old woman constituted cruel and unusual punishment. Three years later the same punishment imposed on a sixteen-year-old also was found to violate constitutional guarantees in Anderson v.
Commonwealth.
5
In 1972, two defendants aged eighteen and twenty-four argued that a life sentence without parole for rape also constituted cruel and unusual punishment. In the eighteen-year-old's case2 the entire court's opinion on the cruel and unusual punishment argument was that "We are not persuaded that the decision in Workman v. trial. Pursuant to the West Virginia habitual criminal statute, Hart was sentenced to a mandatory life sentence.
In holding that the life sentence was unconstitutionally disproportionate to the underlying offenses, the Fourth Circuit developed a series of inquiries to test for disproportionality. First, the court looked to the "nature of the offense itself" 3 12
to determine the proportionality of the sentence. The court did not assess the nature of the offense in light of the state interest in determining habitual offenders, but rather considered the gravity of the underlying offenses. The court discounted the perjury conviction because the petitioner "faced a moral dilemma: to choose between his duty to tell the truth and family loyalty.
' 313 The gravity of the check drawn on insufficient funds was considered "very nearly trivial" ' 14 because "one penny less in the face amount of the check and the offense would have been a five to sixty-day petty misdemeanor." 315 The court never considered the relative seriousness of the second offense, but it noted that none of the offenses "involved violence or danger of violence toward persons or property. 316 Second, the court chose to look behind the legislative purpose in selecting the punishment. In our experience as practicing attorneys or, perhaps, trial judges, how many times have cases come to our attention where it was known to the prosecutor that an accused had issued a veritable flood of bad checks but the prosecutor was satisfied to accept a plea of guilty as to one and dismiss the other charges? Is this not true with reference to multiple offenses of other types and kinds such as breaking and entering, robberies, and the like? What can an appellate court possibly know of the circumstances surrounding every recorded conviction?= , a federal district court in the Fourth Circuit held that a 48-to 50-year sentence for safecracking was unconstitutionally excessive. The defendant had prior convictions for breaking and entering, larceny, loafing and loitering, and armed robbery, and an escape while he was serving the armed robbery sentence. Id. at 377.
The proportionality principle also was employed by the Sixth Circuit to strike down an Ohio statute mandating a ten-year minimum sentence for possession of marijuana for sale and a twenty-year minimum for sale of marijuana in Downey v. Perini. 3 3 Downey was vacated by the Supreme Court in light of an Ohio statutory change which mandated review of prior marijuana sentences.
In 1967 Governor Rockefeller of New York proposed a comprehensive revision of the state's drug laws. The Second Circuit considered the constitutionality of the mandatory penalties provided by the laws in Carmona v. Wardm The New York statute provided for indeterminate life sentences for conviction of all narcotic drug sales and for possession of narcotic drugs in quantities in excess of one ounce. Depending upon various factors the statute called for minimum sentences of fifteen, six, and one year. All convictions carried a mandatory life sentence. The New York Court of Appeals unanimously upheld the penalty scheme in People v. Brodie. 345 The court accepted the proportionality concept under the eighth amendment and the typical analysis employed under that concept. However, the court thought that the gravity of the offense should be assessed more broadly than the individual offenses committed by the challenging defendants. To the New York court the offense was a part of the "pernicious phenomenon of drug distribution," 3 6 and not merely an isolated criminal offense. After the state court failure, Brodie brought his case to the federal district court in a habeas corpus action. The challenge succeeded; the district court held the New York court's analysis flawed because "it is necessary to judge the proportionality of the punishment with relation to the actual offense committed. convicted of possession of cocaine and sentenced to serve a term of six years to life. The other defendant was convicted of the sale of $20 worth of cocaine and sentenced to serve a term of four years to life.
34s The Second Circuit agreed with the New York Court of Appeals that the offense should be assessed in light of the total drug problem and not as two isolated, nonviolent offenses involving relatively small amounts of cocaine.
3 9 The Second Circuit also disagreed with the district court's conclusion that eighth amendment proportionality analysis requires the court to judge the severity of punishment by the maximum possible term.' The court determined that the term of imprisonment should be discounted by the recognized probability of parole. Using this standard, the court concluded that New York was justified in placing severe penalties for drug traffic because of the very serious New York drug problem.3 1 One judge dissented from the panel opinion.3 2 He argued that the New York sentences should be considered one for natural life and the petitioners' crimes should be viewed as part of "the very lowest level of the scale"= " of the drug traffic and that it is improper to place all drug offenders within a single category.
The petition for certiorari was denied by the United States Supreme Court, but Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Powell, filed a dissenting opinion.
3 ' Justice Marshall termed the Second Circuit's view of the nature of the offense "problematic 3"5 and inconsistent with the "fundamental premise of the criminal justice system, that individuals are accountable only for their own criminal acts." 3 5 Justice Marshall also questioned the Second Circuit's choice to discount the punishment by the probability of parole.s 7 Justice Marshall called this analysis "analytically unsatisfying." 3 Finally, Justice Marshall challenged the Second Circuit's holding that a comparatively harsher drug law may be based on a finding 9 that the problem is more acute locally than nationally. Justices Marshall and Powell were willing to consider that Ward indicated that in the future the full Court might consider the far-reaching questions raised by proportionality analysis.
THE RUMMEL OPINIONS
The proportionality issues raised by the state courts and the lower federal courts came to a head in Rummel v. Estelle. 36 (Vernon 1925) , which provides: "Whoever shall have been three times convicted of a felony less than capital shall on such third conviction be imprisoned for life in the penitentiary." As a matter of state law, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has interpreted this statute to provide for a mandatory life sentence only when each successive felony conviction is preceded by a final felony conviction. Tyra v. State, 534 S.W.2d 695, 698 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) . Under Texas law, a criminal conviction is not final until the defendant is imprisoned. No final conviction can result if the defendant successfully fulfills a probationary period.
The en banc court compared the Texas procedure with states that activate habitual offender laws upon proof of any previous conviction or simultaneous, multiple convictions. 587 F.2d at 656-59. State procedures under habitual offender laws are explored in Note, supra note 199, at 78-79; Note, Recidivist Procedures, 40 N.Y.U. L. REv. 332 (1965) .
In 1974, the Texas legislature apparently approved the Court of Criminal Appeals' reading of the statute since the requirements were made more explicit:
If it be shown on the trial of any felony offense that the defendant has previously been finally convicted of the felony offenses, and the second previous felony conviction is for an offense that occurred subsequent to the first previous conviction having become final, on conviction he shall be punished by confinement After an unsuccessful attempt to obtain postconviction relief in the state courts, Rummel sought federal habeas corpus relief in the Western District of Texas. The district court denied relief without a hearing and Rummel took an appeal to the Fifth Circuit. By a divided vote, the panel reversed the district court. The Fifth Circuit, en banc, then vacated the panel decision and affirmed the district court. Ultimately, the Supreme Court affirmed the en banc desicion. 36' Texas has bifurcated criminal trials. The jury must first determine the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, then the jury returns for further argument in the punishment stage and the jury retires for a second time to decide punishment. If the jury unanimously determines the guilt but is unable to agree on punishment, a mistrial must be declared and the state must again prove guilt at the second trial. [Vol. 71 the punishments meted out for other offenses in the same jurisdiction.
Under the first prong of the Hart test, the panel looked to the nature of the offense. 370 The panel apparently thought that if any one of the underlying offenses involved "violence, a potential for violence, or a strong social interest," a life sentence would be constitutional. 3 7 ' Although the panel did not indicate which crimes involve a potential for violence, it did suggest that laws involving narcotics possess a strong social interest. 372 Addressing the question of the seriousness of Rummel's crimes the panel stated:
None of Rummel's offenses present exacerbating factors justifying a severe penalty. Considered in combination, Rummel's crimes,, although felonies under Texas law, lack those indicia of depravity generally associated with felonies and the heinousness of the offenses for which life imprisonment is a common punishment. They were substantially separated in time. None involved violence or the potential for violence. Each was solely a property crime and the amounts taken were not substantial.3 a Second, the panel sought to determine the legislative objective in making conduct a punishable offense.
37* According to the panel this "inquiry seeks to determine whether a significantly less severe punishment could achieve the purposes for which the challenged punishment is inflicted. 375 The panel recognized that an habitual offender law has as its objective "protecting citizens from incorrigible repeat offenders.
3 7 6 However, the panel determined that this legislative interest could be achieved by a lesser punishment. The panel reached this conclusion by looking to the punishment given recidivists in other jurisdictions and 370 Rummel v. Estelle, 568 F.2d at 1197. This Circuit has long followed the principle that a sentence within the statutory limits set by a legislature is not to be considered cruel or unusual punishments given for other offenders in Texas, the last two Hart factors. Next, the panel compared Rummel's sentence with the punishment accorded other crimes in Texas. To this end the panel noted that Texas imposes a mandatory life sentence only for capital murder 3 7 7 and punishes a single felony such as murder, aggravated rape or arson with as little as five years. 378 The panel determined that these other sentences demonstrate that Texas singles out the habitual criminal for irrationally severe punishment.
Last, the panel considered Rummel's sentence in comparison with punishment accorded recidivists in otherjurisdictions.3 9 Central to the panel's analysis is its determination that Rummel's life sentence is one for his natural life, regardless of considerations of parole and pardon. The panel so reasoned because to consider parole is to interject the federal courts into the parole process.3° In a canvass of American jurisdictions, the panel discovered that in addition to Texas, only Indiana, Washington, and West Virginia require a mandatory life sentence upon conviction of a third felony. 
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he expressed sympathy with Rummel's plight, he stated that eighth amendment analysis cannot be guided by personal "feelings of compassion and justice." 3 8 5 He attacked the majority's practice of examining the underlying offenses to establish the unconstitutionality of the punishment. He stated that the offenses, as felonies, were the prerequisites of the enhanced punishment, not the amounts involved.P
THE EN BANC OPINION
The panel opinion provoked sufficient interest to warrant a full court hearing by the Fifth Circuit. On rehearing the panel's decision was narrowly overturned.
38 7 Although the new majority opinion substantially accepted the conceptual framework posited by the panel opinion, the emphasis was markedly dissimilar.
The en bane court rejected the state's argument that there is no power under the eighth amendment to find a legislatively selected prison sentence unconstitutional under a disproportionality theory.m The court canvassed a mass of ill-defined and conflicting cases.
2 While many American jurisdic- The court divided its research into four groups of cases. The first group consisted of Fifth Circuit cases denying any power under the eighth amendment to test the length of prison sentences. Id. at 654 n.3. The second group catalogued cases from other jurisdictions claiming no power under the eight amendment for disproportionality analysis. Id. at 654 n.4. The third group of cases from the Fifth Circuit admitted power under the eighth amendment to test the length of prison sentences. Id. at 654 n.5. Typical of these cases was Rogers v. United States, 304 F.2d 520, 521 (5th Cir. 1962), in which the court said a punishment could be cruel and unusual if "it is so greatly disproportionate to the offense committed as to be completely arbitrary and shocking to the sense of justice." No case, however, interdicted a prison term under this theory. The last group consisted of cases from otherjurisdictions claiming to review the length of prison sentences. 587 F.2d at 655 n.6. Several of these cases tions spoke of a power in the eighth amendment to review the constitutionality of prison sentences, at the time of the court's writing, only and litigant had been relieved of a prison term through habeas corpus litigation in federal court, 39 0 and only a handful had been relieved of prison terms in state court. 391 Moreover, the court also was able to discover many cases which flatly rejected any power to review the length of sentences under the eighth amendment.
3 92
While expressing doubts as to the historical foundation of disproportionality theory, the court concluded that such analysis was contained in the eighth amendment. An apparent dispositive factor in the court's choice was the recognition of disproportionality analysis by individual members of the Supreme Court in death cases. 393 The en banc court, however, took a radically different approach from the panel's inquiry. The panel had looked to the underlying offenses, in this case three relatively minor thefts, but the en banc court concluded that the three separate and distinct convictions comprised the proper focus of inquiry.
3 98 In short, the court treated the status of habitual criminal as a distinct offense, apart from the underlying offenses. The court said that it arrived at this conclusion via the "first principle of... analysis-that every inference is to be made in favor of the selected punishment. ' , 399 Moreover, the en banc court stressed its conclusion that the probability of parole should be taken into account. 4°° To the majority, the enhanced recidivist punishment was not a sentence for natural life, but a sentence for between ten and twelve years, with further incarceration conditioned on good behavior. 40 The court concluded that a sentence of at least ten years did not violate the eighth amendment. If one reads the "majority's assertion" to refer to "confirms the gross disproportionality of Rummel's sentence," then the en banc opinion can be read to hold a sentence for natural life without possibility of parole unconstitutional. The en banc dissent takes this reading. Id. at 665-66.
The other reading would read the majority's assertibn to refer to a comparison made by the panel opinion without comment as to the legal effect of such comparison.
08 587 F.2d at 659-60. 4m Id. at 659. The court reached this conclusion by surveying other jurisdictions.
41o The court noted that three states punish a four-time felon with a mandatory life sentence and eight states give discretionary power to punish a three-time felon with a life sentence. The states are canvassed at Id. at 660 nn.22, 23.
this, the court said that at first glance it appeared that none of the other eleven states would sentence Rummel to the maximum life term. However, taking into account the peculiar Texas system and the fact that the court did not examine Rummel's entire record, it was possible that he would have received the same sentence in the other states. record developed in the case, apparently believed that factors other than those apparent under the state procedural system were relevant to the proportionality analysis.
Next, the en banc court held that while it considered the internal ranking of punishments a state selects as relevant to the proportionality analysis, it felt that in Rummel's case it was inappropriate to compare the punishment given for one crime with the punishment given under the recidivist statute.
4 1 3 Finally, the court rejected the panel's attempt to determine if the state's purpose in selecting a sentence could be served by a significantly lesser punishment. 4 4 The court refused to make this inquiry because it was not convinced that a majority of the Supreme Court had embraced this test in death cases, and it was convinced that for penalties less than death, a state would never be able to justify the particular penalty selected by the legislature.
415
The en banc majority concluded that while much could be said against the Texas habitual criminal statute, the judicial function did not include reweighing of the choices made by the Texas legislature. Throughout the litigation Rummel had argued that all three of his crimes were nonviolent and that the Texas recidivist statute should be applied only when one of the crimes was violent. The court answered that while Rummel may have suggested a rational system perhaps better than the one selected by Texas, his burden under the eighth amendment was to prove that Texas' system was irrational, not to posit a better system.
Six members of the fourteen-member court dissented from the majority opinion. The dissent took issue with the majority's inclusion of the probability of parole into the eighth amendment calculus.
The dissent argued that a defendant has no constitutional right to parole and that since the parole process was largely immune from judicial review, parole gave the prisoner no protectable expectation of release. Rehnquist's majority opinion carefully noted that Rummel did not involve a challenge to recidivist statutes generally, nor did the case question the state's authority to make any of Rummel's three crimes a felony.
19
The Court's analysis proceeded from the proposition that the proportionality language in the capital punishment line of cases is "of limited assistance" 4 " 2 when determining the constitutionality of a sentence less than death. Moreover, the Court read Weens v. United States as limited to "the extreme facts of that case. ' 421 To the Court, the Weems holding resulted from a combination of factors: the triviality of the offense, the length of the minimum term sentence, and the extraordinary nature of the post-imprisonment punishment included within cadena temporal. ? Justice Rehnquist then suggested that when the challenge to a punishment goes merely to its length, as compared to the seriousness of the offense, the choice becomes a subjective one.
42s
Starting with Hart v. Coiner, and followed by the panel and en banc opinions in Rummel, the lower federal courts obviously recognized the difficulty in establishing a set of objective standards for determining proportionality. The Supreme Court, however, rejected the Hart and Rummel panel determinations that the presence or absence of violence is an objective standard upon which to base a proportionality determination.
427 Justice Rehnquist suggested that a high official in a large cor- Most courts to accept the proportionality concept examine only the nature of the offense to determine its place in the hierarchy of criminal behavior. Other courts have added the requirement that the court inquire into the nature of the offender as well. For example, in Anderson v. 457 the Fourth Circuit upheld a five-year sentence for making an obscene telephone call. In so doing the court noted, "The sentencing judge was doubtless influenced and properly so, by Wood's prior criminal record.
•, 4 18 If these courts are correct, the eighth amendment must also require that the punishment be proportioned to the offender as well as to the offense. This raises the difficult problem of how the courts, and more troubling, the appellate courts, are to know the character of the offender.
In Rummel, the petitioner evades this conclusion and demands that the court look only to the nature of the three property offenses. As this article has previously mentioned, the indictment upon which Rummel was convicted alleges only the three property crimes because of the requirements of Texas law. The state is anxious to show that Rummel, in fact, has been convicted of many other crimes and has been to prison on at least three prior occasions.
Rummel argues that the state's offer of proof is immaterial because "by mandating life sentences for those convicted of a third felony the Texas Legislature foreclosed proof of mitigating circumstances and pleas for mercy and compassion." 459 This position is analytically sound, yet troubling. On the one hand, Rummel insists that he is entitled to an as-applied attack upon a constitutionally proper statute, but, on the other hand, the state is s in which the en banc court found a sentence selected by a judge and jury, disproportionately severe for the sale of marijuana.
The most difficult case, and the case that must follow Rummel, is an attack on a sentence selected by a jury for aggravating circumstances for which the defendant was not convicted. In Cobern v. State 464 the state of Alabama exacted the death penalty for robbery of a 1957 Chevrolet. By any standard, one must agree that this penalty is disproportionate in the abstract. However, the court's description of the robbery may lead to a different conclusion:
The circumstantial evidence, aside from appellant's confession, shows rather conclusively that he murdered Mamie Belle Walker, took some of herjewelry and her automobile, and left the state. The body was in a deplorable condition, her skull practically beaten into pieces, a 22 caliber rifle bullet wound in the chest which penetrated the body. The doctor testified that these two wounds were sufficient to 460 100 S. 
1980]
cause death. Her body was otherwise bruised and mutilated, including the puncturing of her vaginal area, evidently with a poker found in the room, on which were vaginal hairs similar to those of the victim.
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Cobern was not convicted of rape and murder, but if Cobern were to argue that his death sentence is disproportionate to his offense, is the court bound to look only at the face of the conviction?
Another example concerns the story broadcast on the popular CBS Show, Sixty Minutes, of a Florida woman who received a fifteen-year prison sentence for a five dollar theft. In the abstract, this penalty also seems disproportionately severe. However, the sentence was the product of plea bargaining. The woman could have been charged with auto theft, kidnapping, and armed robbery. In exchange for dropping the other charges, the woman pleaded guilty to taking a five dollar bill from a purse during the kidnapping. If this woman were to argue that her sentence is disproportionate, is the state allowed to justify the sentence with information outside the record and outside the formal proof of trial? Court upheld the use of a presentence report in the sentencing decision even though the report had not formally been admitted into evidence. In Williams, the defendant had been convicted of murder, and the trial judge sentenced the defendant to death. In doing so, the trial judge relied on the presentence report which accused the defendant of thirty burglaries even though the defendant had never been convicted of any of the burglaries. Williams strongly suggests that the state ought to be able to justify a defendant's sentence with information concerning the nature of plea bargaining, and the nature of other offenses committed by the defendant. The Maximum Sentence Argument
The first court to engage in an extensive analysis of the parole probability in proportionality analysis was the Supreme Court of California in In re Lynch. 4 held that the possibility of parole creates no liberty interest protected by due process. A second argument supporting this position is that if the possibility of parole is considered, no defendant will ever again have the opportunity to argue to a court that his sentence is excessive as the executive authorities will become the "ultimate arbiters in eighth amendment analysis." 48 The third argument advanced for not considering parole is that the "added 'crime' of a 'bad attitude' in prison ' 481 would probably prohibit parole and could make a sentence excessive. The final argument made in favor of the no parole consideration position is that even after the defendant is released from incarceration, he would be subject to rules and conditions adopted by the relevant state authorities with the concomitant threat of prison hanging over him for minor, noncriminal violations. "
2
The Possibility of Parole Argument
The Second Circuit was the first court to explicitly conclude that the possibility of parole should be considered in the eighth amendment formula. In Carmona v. Ward 4 8 that court argued that it is unrealistic to assume that on one hand the court should consider all the mitigating circumstances of the crime but on the other hand assume that the offender will be so incorrigible that he will never The court further added that while parole is not a vested right, it is inappropriate to assume that the local authorities will improperly deny conditional release.
85
In Rummel the Fifth Circuit, en banc, followed the Second Circuit's analysis. The Rummel court added to the Second Circuit's reasoning that to "ignore the Texas good time system is to close our eyes to reality" 4s 6 and to assume that the life sentence is one without the possibility of parole. The real world argument was best expressed by the Rummel court in its comparison of Rummel's punishment with those in other states:
Me... have held that the likely probability of Rummel's jail term should be compared with the experience of other states. This Rummel has not done, and our research suggests that Rummel's actual jail time would not be significantly longer in Texas than his jail time in many other states. An example will illustrate our point. Suppose that State A gives a ten-year sentence for the same theft. State A has a practice of fixed and determinate sentences and does not award early release based on good time or discretionary parole. State B, however, is similar to Texas and through long experience it can be shown that the thirty-year sentence amounts to about ten years imprisonment. Can it justifiably be said that State B punishes the theft three times more severely than State A? This Court thinks not.
7
Suggested Resolution
Of the arguments offered in support of not considering parole, only the "no vested right" position is substantial. The argument that if parole is considered, the defendant will never have the opportunity to have his sentence tested and his future bad attitude may preclude parole forever, is insubstantial. There is no reason why a defendant serving an indeterminate sentence may not, some time in the future, argue that he has served a constitutionally appropriate sentence and therefore is entitled to relief. Indeed, there is precedent for such a position. In In re Rodriquez 48 8 the defendant had served twenty-two years of an indeterminate sentence for conviction for lewd and lascivious acts on a child. The California Supreme Court held that, considering the circumstances, the twenty-two-year sentence was excessive. lows the habitual offender more freedom. The eighth amendment speaks of punishments and not merely sentences. A court ought not to strike down a punishment scheme unless the entire scheme is excessive. It is much too narrow to look only at the express sentence under the eighth amendment. Take the example of the United States habitual offender statute. 18 U.S.C. § 3575 provides for a twenty-five-year sentence for certain habitual offenders. Under this statute the offender may gain discretionary release after serving about sixteen years in prison.
Given a choice, would an offender choose to serve a life sentence in Texas or a twenty-five-year sentence in federal prison? Can we say that the eighth amendment answers this question as a constitutional matter? 497 In Rummel, the Supreme Court properly concluded that parole is a part of the proper assessment of Rummel's sentence. 
THE SLIPPERY SLOPE AND THE ROLE OF AN APPELLATE COURT
In his dissent to the panel opinion in Rummel, Judge Thornberry expressed the opinion that the majority's opinion represented the "slippery slope in its most classic sense. , 4 9 This section addresses this single most important consideration in proportionality analysis and advocates that the insuperable problems associated with the slippery slope call for a rejection of activist intervention by the courts under a proportionality analysis.
The Rummel Panel Standard
The Fifth Circuit panel opinion suggested that if any one of the underlying offenses involved "violence, a potential for violence, or a strong social interest"
' 5 a life sentence would be constitutional.
are granted parole in their second year of eligibility. By the third and fourth year of eligibility, the figure approaches 100 percent." Brief for Respondent at 24, Rummel v. Estelle, 100 S. Ct. 1133. 496 18 U.S.C. § 3575 does have the advantage of being more finely tailored than the Texas statute.
497 18 U.S.C. § 4161 provides that a federal prisoner may earn a maximum of ten days per month good time credit.
"' Rummel makes no argument that a 10-to 12-year sentence would be unconstitutional; however, if we consider the life sentence as an indeterminate sentence precluding parole for ten years, this sentence is suspect in California under the Goss rationale.
09 568 F.2d at 1202.
-'o0 Id. at 1196.
Consistent with this standard, a later Fifth Circuit panel upheld the imposition of a life sentence on a defendant convicted of two burglaries and a forgery in Chapman v. Estelle.5°' The Fourth Circuit rejected a Hart challenge to a life sentence when the underlying offenses were grand larceny, breaking and entering a grocery store, and burglary of a residence in Griffin v. Warden.5°2 If one is forced to assume that the life sentence must be considered one for the natural life of the offender, is it any more conscionable to imprison Chapman and Griffin for life than Rummel and Hart?
The distinction between nonviolent and violent crimes, between those crimes witl potential for violence and those crimes with no potential for violence, and those crimes with a strong social interest, is almost an impossible distinction to make in practice. This is demonstrated by the following taken from the oral argument in the The concept of a special social interest is invalid. If a state has a sufficient reason to legitimately prohibit some conduct as a felony, it is mere judicial force of will to say that some laws represent a special interest and are therefore immune from proportionality scrutiny.
The Flood
A related problem to the slippery slope is the problem of a flood of litigation. The petitioner in Rummel and the state of Texas engaged in a reckless discussion concerning the number of cases generated in Texas under the habitual criminal statute. 512 The effect in Texas is, of course, only the tip of the iceberg. The proportionality analysis, adopted by the Supreme Court, applies to every 5o5' Id. at 1143 n.27. 506 568 F.2d at 1198. 507 387 Mich. 167, 194 N.W.2d 827. sentence in every American jurisdiction. The Fifth Circuit panel opinion in Rummel suggested that proportionality analysis might be limited to death and life sentences; 5 3 however, such a suggestion is unsound. It would be an outrageous result to inquire into the excessiveness of a life sentence and not consider a sixty-year sentence.
1 4
The mere proof of a flood of litigation certainly should not deter a court from upholding the constitutional rights of litigants. It is, however, a permissible factor to consider when considering the difficult questions of standards. Rummel argues that " [I] stitutional for two young rapists. 5 2 1 But when faced with considering the same sentence imposed on an offender a few years older, the Kentucky court simply stated that the rule of the prior two cases did not apply.
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The California experience with the proportionality test represents both the flood-stopping concept and the flood.sss After the intermediate appellate courts in California were reading In re Lynch in a totally unpredictable manner, the California Supreme court in In re Wingo stopped the flood of litigation by holding that attacks to an indeterminate sentence were premature until the California adult authority set a release date.
Certainly, the proportionality analysis must be applied to an extraordinarily broad range of criminal sentences and the vast majority of state court flood-stopping devices cannot appropriately be applied to stop the potential flood.sss
JUDICIAL RESTRAINT
Beyond the problem of the slippery slope is the question of the appropriate role of the appellate court in the proportionality analysis. One respected observer has noted that appellate review of sentences "would administer the coup de grace to courts of appeals as we know them. ' California appellate judge joined in an opinion striking down a part of a sentence providing for a five-year parole preclusion for a recidivist narcotics offender convicted of possession of heroin with the statement that the sentence could not be "found to be out of proportion to the offense when tested against any rational standard." Id. at 180 (Puglia, P.J., concurring).
5 The California timing case is a probable exception. Such a device could be constitutionally used for the proportionality test. Another possible flood-stopping device for the federal courts is a habeas corpus preclusion similar to that of Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976 
